 | Samuel Goodstein Grand Illusion |
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Historians will look back upon the Arab-Israeli peace process of the early 1990s and note two monumental events - one for its great offer of hope, the other as a dark harbinger of turmoil. These events: The Arafat-Rabin handshake in 1993 and the attacks perpetrated by Hamas on Israeli civilians in the winter of 1996. The handshake, and the Oslo Accords that preceded it, not only established a framework for peace, they created a generation of young Israelis ready, even expecting, peaceful relations with their neighbors - Israelis who viewed Yitzhak Rabin not as the brilliant and calculating military strategist most Israelis knew, but as a visionary of peace.
Conversely, Hamas' suicide bombings turned the Israeli electorate, already reeling by the assasination of Rabin by one of their own, on its head. More important, the attacks gave right-wing extremist Jews and the Likud Party new and powerful political allies: Israelis who yearned for peace but were scared into voting for Likud, out of a justifiable fear over their own security. The matchmaker in this Jewish political wedding was, of course, Hamas. So extremist Palestinians drove the Israeli political center into the waiting arms of the Israeli right: Enter Benjamin Netanyahu, elected by this rearranged electorate.
In the end, extremists and right-wingers on both sides of the conflict got their respective wishes: Hamas, which unequivocally opposes the peace process, got stalled negotiations; right-wing Israelis got a government willing to expand settlements in the West Bank and unwilling to consider the possibility of Palestinian statehood.
What has been the benefit to most Israelis from this process? Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to answer. The most important benefit Netanyahu promised, "peace with security," has not been realized: the threat of Hamas attacks has not receded significantly, Syria is semi-seriously preparing for war, and violence has resumed between the Israeli Army and Palestinians (leaving more than 60 Palestineans and 15 Israelis dead in the past few months) - this time, however, the Palestinians have guns, not rocks. Israel, despite the Likudniks' claims, is not more secure today than before Netanyahu's election. Furthermore, the renewed threat of violence and instability threatens to slow Israel's economic revival; Rabin and Peres understood that the peace process is necessary not only for security, but for Israel to continue its impressive economic growth. This growth is jeopardized by the current stalemate.
How quickly hope has melted into fear.
Many on the left criticize Netanyahu for not having a vision; to the contrary, he has a vision - his vision is exactly the problem. Netanyahu's long-term vision is to reach a detente, whereby the Palestinians get autonomy but not statehood. His short-term vision is to move through negotiations at such a torturously slow pace, breaking promises made at Oslo along the way, that any significant breakthrough is impossible - ad hocracy in its ugliest form. A key breakthrough, after all, would not satisfy the most vocal elements of his constituency. The negotiations over Hebron is a prime example of this dynamic in action.
The Palestinians, however, are unlikely to accept these visions. An economy in utter shambles gives the Palestinian anti-peace movement a tangible battle cry: unemployment is more than 50 percent, Palestinian employment in Israel has fallen from 150,000 to 30,000 since the suicide bombings, and Palestinian incomes have fallen by one-third, to $4,000, in the past three years. It is no secret that people are more sympathetic to nationalist or extremist views when they are poor and face few prospects for a brighter future.
So while Netanyahu has both a long- and short-term vision, it is unlikely that this vision can lead to anything but renewed stalemate, violence and, possibly, war. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and to a degree between Israel and all Arab states, cannot be fully resolved until there is a free Palestinian state - which, of course, will not have a regular army. This may not please people, but it is a fact. If the conflict is to end, the political suppression of Palestinians must end with it - otherwise, there will be no long-term, stable resolution.
I met an Israeli on an airplane this summer who had just finished his military service in the Golan Heights. He told me that he supported Labor for one reason: "In Israel, many of us think in terms of war or peace. Before Netanyahu, we thought peace. Now, we think that war is a real possibility again. It is all about momentum, and this is slipping away."
- Samuel Goodstein can be reached over e-mail at faygo@umich.edu, and he wishes to thank Prof. Zach Levey.