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He finds it in a document that he thrusts at a reporter in his ornate office in this sun-drenched Alpine resort. In the document, Russian prosecutors allege that in June 1995, in a government office in Moscow and in front of several witnesses, Pacolli delivered a briefcase stuffed with U.S. currency, a Cartier watch and a diamond-studded brooch to Pavel Borodin, President Boris Yeltsin's chief of administrative affairs.
The source of the allegation is a Russian businessman who acknowledges he was not in the room but says he heard about the incident from someone who was, according to the prosecutor's documents.
"I ask you: Is this ridiculous? In the presence of these people, open a briefcase and give this to Borodin?" said Pacolli. "It is absolutely absurd!''
The briefcase story is one of many now swirling around Pacolli, whose success in obtaining Russian government contracts over the past six years boosted his fledgling construction firm here into a far-flung enterprise, with branches in 18 countries and reported gross income in 1997 of $90 million.
A Swiss investigation has uncovered evidence that Pacolli paid roughly $10 million in bribes to high-ranking officials in Moscow, law enforcement sources have said.
The most prominent recipients of his largess, authorities suggest, were Yeltsin and his two daughters. Pacolli paid tens of thousands of dollars of credit card bills in their names and transferred $1 million to a Budapest bank account for the president's benefit, according to the law enforcement sources.
Pacolli said in two interviews here last week that he never paid credit card bills for the Yeltsins, although he acknowledged he did pay such bills in Switzerland for other Russian officials. He said those payments covered expenses incurred by the Russians during trips to Switzerland for business with Mabetex.
Pacolli said the $1 million sent to the Hungarian bank went to a firm that handled advertising and public relations for Mabetex. He was vague about who headed the firm or where it was located - saying Swiss prosecutors took most of his documents - although he suggested it might be based in the Caribbean.
The Kremlin has denied the Yeltsins have foreign bank accounts; otherwise, it has left the defense largely to Borodin, who says the allegations are ludicrous.
No one is sure if the Russian prosecutors are pursuing the case. Suspended Russian chief prosecutor Yuri Skuratov said investigators searched his home
Thursday in an effort to find and suppress any incriminating documents he might have taken with him when Yeltsin took him off the case.
Carla del Ponte, the hard-charging Swiss general prosecutor who personally interviewed witnesses and supervised searches to assist Skuratov, said in an
interview last week that she has "not lost hope that the investigation will be carried out in Moscow.''
She confirmed the Kremlin's statement that neither Yeltsin nor his daughters have Swiss bank accounts in their names. She repeated that it is not a crime in
Switzerland to corrupt a foreign official, although the Swiss parliament might soon change that.
Still, the Swiss have opened an inquiry on the assumption that the Russians may prove the payments from Mabetex were the result of corruption - in which
case the use of Swiss accounts would constitute money laundering.
Pacolli, 48, has laid off about 40 percent of his staff in Lugano and says he has not won a single contract since January.
Deputy Foreign Minister Yiannos Kranidiotis, his 23-year-old son Nikos, and four others were killed, said Romanian Transport Minister Traian Basescu. Three others were hospitalized while the four others aboard were not injured.
The pilot and co-pilot were among those unhurt and were able to land the government-owned Falcon executive jet in Bucharest, Basescu said.
Kranidiotis, 51, was on his way to Bucharest, Romania, for a meeting of Balkan foreign ministers when the aircraft apparently hit turbulence and quickly dropped from 23,000 feet to 4,000 feet before the pilot regained control, said Gabriel Dumitrescu, the head of Romania's civil aviation authority.
The incident occurred shortly after the plane entered Romanian airspace near Giurgiu, 40 miles southeast of Bucharest.
Apart from the deputy minister and his son, two journalists, Kranidiotis' bodyguard and the plane's engineer were killed.
''We are very shaken, the whole government, the whole ministry'' said Foreign Minister George Papandreou, visibly upset. ''I personally can't believe it. We lost people giving a battle for peace in the Balkans. I've lost a friend. ... Greece and Cyprus have lost a tireless worker for human rights.''
A lawyer, the Cypriot-born Kranidiotis was general secretary of the foreign ministry for European affairs from 1994 to1995, and then became deputy foreign minister. Earlier this year, he was promoted to the number two position in the ministry, and concentrated on European and Cypriot affairs.
Kranidiotis studied at Harvard University and Sussex University in Britain and authored of several books on Greece and Cypriot politics. Nikos was his only son.
BUCHAREST, Romania (AP) - Greece's deputy foreign minister and five others were killed late yesterday when their executive jet hit heavy turbulence and plummeted thousands of feet before leveling off, Greek and Romanian officials said.
The cause of the deaths wasn't immediately clear.
Romanian television reports said Kranidiotis and the others possibly suffocated or suffered heart attacks after their aircraft suddenly depressurized as it rapidly lost altitude.
The pilot and co-pilot were among those unhurt and were able to land the government-owned Falcon executive jet in Bucharest, Basescu said.
Kranidiotis, 51, was on his way to Bucharest, Romania, for a meeting of Balkan foreign ministers when the aircraft apparently hit turbulence and quickly dropped from 23,000 feet to 4,000 feet before the pilot regained control, said Gabriel Dumitrescu, the head of Romania's civil aviation authority.
The incident occurred shortly after the plane entered Romanian airspace near Giurgiu, 40 miles southeast of Bucharest.
Apart from the deputy minister and his son, two journalists, Kranidiotis' bodyguard and the plane's engineer were killed.
''We are very shaken, the whole government, the whole ministry'' said Foreign Minister George Papandreou, visibly upset. ''I personally can't believe it. We lost people giving a battle for peace in the Balkans. I've lost a friend. ... Greece and Cyprus have lost a tireless worker for human rights.''
A lawyer, the Cypriot-born Kranidiotis was general secretary of the foreign ministry for European affairs from 1994 to1995, and then became deputy foreign minister. Earlier this year, he was promoted to the number two position in the ministry, and concentrated on European and Cypriot affairs.
Kranidiotis studied at Harvard University and Sussex University in Britain and authored of several books on Greece and Cypriot politics. Nikos was his only son.
in future conflicts and must be addressed, according to comments by top defense leaders and reports prepared by NATO commanders and Pentagon officials.
Among the top concerns was the ability of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to spare the destruction of his air defense system by craftily using it for short periods or by simply turning it off. As a result, even the American military's high-tech weapons could not pinpoint his radar and anti-aircraft systems, forcing allied aircraft to fly at higher altitudes to avoid those threats.
``That's something we've got to figure out,'' said one military officer
involved in the bombing campaign.
On the other hand, military leaders have concluded that NATO's unshakable
solidarity, as well as a new - and relatively inexpensive - American bomb
helped secure victory against Yugoslav forces.
Initially, military leaders were surprised that Milosevic did not yield
quickly in the face of punishing airstrikes, and they had to react quickly to
his unorthodox tactics. Defense experts have long warned that second-tier
nations and state-sponsored terrorists will turn to unconventional means -
such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons - to fight a military power
like the United States. In Kosovo, Milosevic came up with a new twist:
hundreds of thousands of refugees.
``Belgrade's battle strategy included a deliberate, manufactured
humanitarian crisis, a crisis that required NATO to undertake a massive
humanitarian mission at the same time that we were conducting combat
operations,'' Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said in a speech last week
in California.
Although Cohen said NATO's ``flexibility'' allowed it to handle both
challenges, the defense secretary said Milosevic's forced expulsion of ethnic
Albanians was a ``crowning lesson'' for a superior force battling a lesser but
determined foe.
Cohen also said that because many of America's NATO allies have not kept
pace with the high technology of war - from precision-guided weapons to
communications equipment that enemies cannot penetrate - the United
States had to carry out two-thirds of all support flights, from intelligence
gathering to refueling, along with half the combat missions.
``If our European allies are to close the distance with American technology,
they simply must make a greater investment in national security,'' Cohen
said.
Similar concerns were raised in briefing documents on Kosovo being
prepared by the staff of Adm. James O. Ellis, commander of U.S. Naval Forces
in Southern Europe and one of the senior military leaders in the Kosovo
operation.
One portion of the briefing documents, scheduled to be given to top Pentagon
officials and obtained by The Baltimore Sun, discusses ``the new `American
Way of War,' '' noting that the United States is the only country with all the
best weapons, aircraft and training, ``but our allies cannot match us.''
Meanwhile, divisions within NATO's political leadership led to an
``incremental war'' instead of ``decisive operations,'' the documents say,
hinting at the military's complaints that the 19-nation alliance debated,
bickered and delayed action on all aspects of the war, from bombing targets
to ground troops and humanitarian aid.
The air war was ``superbly executed'' - with 38,000 round-the-clock sorties
and no loss of an aircrew - but ``politically constrained,'' the documents say.
Cohen himself alluded to the tensions within NATO in his address to the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in San Diego, though far more
delicately.
Consensus is both the ``heart'' and the ``hindrance'' of a coalition, Cohen said,
before noting that as the conflict progressed, the allies ``shifted more
authority to commanders in the field.''
Those withering airstrikes succeeded against the Yugoslav tanks and armor
only after the Kosovo Liberation Army had mounted a major offensive and
had drawn the enemy into the open, where they could be hit by NATO aircraft,
the briefing documents said.
Capt. Steve Burnett, a spokesman for Ellis, cautioned that the briefing
papers, titled ``The View From the Top,'' are only a ``working document'' that
has yet to be approved by the admiral.
Yet the briefing papers echo what defense experts have been saying since
shortly after the war began in March.
Indeed, some of the same issues are expected to come up this week, when
Gen. Wesley K. Clark, NATO's supreme commander, briefs allied leaders on
the lessons learned from Kosovo. By the end of the month, another
post-mortem is expected from Deputy Defense Secretary John J. Hamre and
Air Force Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(Begin optional trim)
The Ellis briefing papers praise the combat debut of the B-2 bomber as well
as the Joint Direct Attack Munition. This is a bomb that is guided by a Global
Positioning System and can be used in any type of weather, unlike some
sophisticated laser-guided weapons that are disabled by clouds.
Many of the bombing missions were scrubbed because of poor weather.
``Laser-guided munitions cannot hit what the pilots cannot see,'' the report
stated.
But the new precision bomb proved so valuable in Kosovo that it was used as
quickly as it was produced, the draft report says. Such bombs, guided by
satellite technology, should be a priority for both the United States and its
allies, the briefing papers state.
(End optional trim)
The briefing documents prepared for Ellis also suggest that the lack of
ground troops - or even preparation for them - ``probably prolonged the air
campaign.''
Retired U.S. Army Gen. George A. Joulwan, Clark's predecessor as NATO's
supreme commander, has also criticized the lack of preparation for a ground
war.
``We didn't give Milosevic something else to think about,'' Joulwan said. ``Our
only response was in the air. (Milosevic) was calling the shots. Only the
enemy could decide when the war was over.''
Only after more than two months of bombing did President Clinton and other
leaders harden their rhetoric and raise the possibility of using ground
troops.
Distributed by the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service=
09-15-99
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